by Norman A. Bailey, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow, Potomac Foundation
Formerly Special Assistant to President Reagan for International Economic Affairs
In recent decades economic statecraft, that is, the use of economic measures to contribute to the achievement of foreign policy goals, has practically been reduced to the use of trade sanctions and/or financial aid. The limited effectiveness of trade sanctions has been widely commented on. Although not always ineffective, they are usually resorted to more to satisfy domestic interests or to make a symbolic statement than from any realistic belief that they are likely to achieve a particular foreign policy goal. Similarly, financial aid (in effect, a form of bribery), has proven to be of limited use, as recently demonstrated in North Korea. The importance of economic statecraft, however, is attested to by its contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Measures adopted included limiting Soviet hard currency earnings and implementing a highly successful deception program with reference to Soviet acquisition of Western military-related technologies. The traditional hackneyed mix of trade sanctions and financial incentives were tried several times during the Cold War with very limited success. They have frequently been used elsewhere with similarly disappointing results.
The economic strategy arsenal, however, holds many weapons beyond these two. The ultimate weapon in this arsenal, blockade, has gone almost entirely out of use. It is high time that it was revived as a potential strategic tool. According to traditional international law declaring a blockade of another country constitutes an act of war. Third parties must then choose between honoring the blockade or attempting to run it, with the corresponding risks. Blockade has a long and often effective history: The United States blockaded the Confederate States during the Civil War with substantial although by no means total effectiveness. Great Britain’s blockade of continental Europe during the Napoleonic wars was an important factor in France’s ultimate defeat. During World War I the United Kingdom blockaded Germany and Germany declared a blockade of the UK, to be enforced by submarines. Both blockades were effective but the refusal of the United States to recognize the German blockade while recognizing the British blockade resulted in the entry of the U.S. into the war when its ships were intercepted and sunk.
The most recent and successful application of blockade was the partial blockade of Cuba declared by the United States in 1962. Without a shot being fired, the Soviet Union was prevented from installing missiles in Cuba. Blockade is by no means always an appropriate measure, of course. Terrain is significant. Cuba is an island in close proximity to the U.S. Although an air and sea blockade technically could have been effective in Vietnam, enforcing it would undoubtedly have brought conflict with China, of not also Russia. A land blockade would have been impossible because of the terrain.
Nevertheless, blockade should certainly have been considered in the case of Iraq in 2003. Due to the terrain involved there and the fact that Iraq had no powerful friendly neighbor or protector, a total blockade could easily have been enforced, by land, sea and air. Moreover, modern technologies would have made it possible to isolate the country from all communication with the outside world, except for one channel kept open to accept its surrender. Attempts to run the blockade would have quickly ceased after warning (and if necessary lethal) shots were fired. Visibility would have been no problem, as it would have been in Vietnam. Total isolation of the country would have undoubtedly led to its surrender within days and most likely with minimum casualties.
Blockade, a time-honored measure of economic statecraft, should be taken out of the closet, dusted off and added to the mix of strategic utilized in the implementation of foreign policy objectives.
